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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The empirical audit committee literature is both diverse and expansive, 
with rapid growth in recent years based on increased concerns about corporate 
governance and the quality of financial reporting. Our objective in this paper is 
to synthesize empirical literature on audit committee effectiveness to guide 
future thinking and research on audit committees. To organize our review, we 
focus on four components that we believe contribute to audit committee effec-
tiveness (ACE) - audit committee composition, authority, resources, and dili-
gence. 
Our motivation stems from the intensifying interest in audit committees 
and the quality of audit committee oversight. Numerous professional publica-
tions (see Exhibit 1) address audit committee performance and responsibilities 
in an increasingly complex global business environment where well-publicized 
financial reporting challenges and problems are prominent. Expectations of 
audit committees have increased dramatically [e.g., BRC, 1999; Burke and 
Guy, 2001; Grant Thornton, 1997; Levitt, 1998; NACD, 2000; Rezaee and 
Farmer, 1994; SEC, 1999b], with a number of high profile initiatives bringing 
focus to the challenge of achieving effectiveness. 
For example, the Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees [BRC, 1999] and the National 
We greatly appreciate support from KPMG's Audit Committee Institute, the Corporate Governance 
Center at Kennesaw State University, and The University of Alabama. We thank the editor, the anonymous 
reviewers, Mark Beasley, Joe Carcello, Linda Hadden, Rich Houston, Tom Lee, and Terry Neal for their 
helpful comments. 
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Exhibit 1 
Selected Professional Literature Focusing on Audit Committees 
Audit Committees: A Guide for Directors, Management, and Consultants [Burke 
and Guy, 2001] 
Audit Committee Quarterly Updates [KPMG Audit Committee Institute, 2001] 
Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees: A Practical 
Guide [NACD, 2000] 
Audit Committee Briefing: Understanding the 2jS' Century Audit Committee and 
Its Governance Roles [Verschoor, 2000] 
Improving Audit Committee Performance: What Works Best, r Edition [PwC, 
2000] 
Audit Committees: Implementing the New Rules [Ernst & Young, 2000] 
Audit Committees: Implementing the New Requirements for the Year 2000 
[Deloitte & Touche, 2000] 
New Responsibilities and Requirements for Audit Committees [Arthur Andersen, 
2000] 
Final Rule: Audit Committee Disclosure [Securities and Exchange Commission, 
1999b] 
Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees [BRC, 1999] 
Audit Committees: Best Practices for Protecting Shareholder Interests [PwC, 
1999] 
The Audit Committee Handbook, 3m Edition [Braiotta, 1999] 
Shaping the Audit Committee Agenda [KPMG, 1999] 
The Audit Committee Symposium: A Balanced Responsibility [Arthur Andersen 
and FEI, 1999] 
Global Best Practices for Audit Committees [Arthur Andersen, 1998] 
The Audit Committee: A Broader Mandate [Bacon, 1998] 
The Expanded Role of the Audit Committee [Grant Thornton, 1997] 
The Audit Committee: An International Perspective [Vanasco, 1994] 
Improving the Effectiveness of the Audit Committee [Rittenberg and Nair, 1993] 
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Association of Corporate Directors' Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Com-
mission on Audit Committees [NACO, 2000] both provide numerous reco~­
mendations for improving ACE and highlight the recent surge in interest m 
performance quality. The SEC' s ne~ ~isclos~e rules for audit cOJn?littees 
[SEC, 1999b], new stock exchange hstmg reqUirements related to audlt co~­
mittees, and enhanced auditor requirements for communication with audlt 
committees [e.g., A1CPA, 1999] also provide important examples of efforts to 
improve ACE. . . 
In addition, a host of authors and organizations have issued publtcatlons 
on "best practices" for audit committees [e.g., Arthur Andersen, 2000; Burke 
and Guy, 2001; PwC, 2000; Verschoor, 2000]. Most recently, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act [2002] tightened the defmition of audit committee member inde-
pendence and required the external auditor to report directly to the audit co~­
mittee. The major stock exchanges in the U.S. have proposed changes to thetr 
governance-related listing requirements, partly to enhance the independenc.e 
and expertise of audit committees.\ In all cases, reform efforts focus on identi-
fying and controlling the various dimensions of ACE to strengthen oversight of 
financial reporting, internal control, risk management, and auditing processe~. 
In the next section, we provide background on the audit committee and lts 
role in corporate governance. In section three, we provide a formal definition 
of ACE and a discussion of ACE determinants to guide the subsequent litera-
ture synthesis (in section four) and discussion of future research directions (in 
section five). 
2.0 AUDIT COMMITTEE BACKGROUND 
Boards of directors assume an important role in corporate governance. 
Due to the separation of corporate management and ownership, boards exist to 
protect the interests of the shareholders. Agency theory suggests that shar~­
holders require protection because management (agents) may not always act m 
the interests of the corporation's owners (principals) [Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. To deal with this agency problem, 
the board assumes an oversight role that typically involves monitoring th.e 
CEO and other top executives, approving the corporation's strategy, and monl-
toring the control system. 
Given its diverse responsibilities, the board of directors delegates some of 
its oversight to the audit committee and other committees of the board. Many 
publications prescribe three broad areas of audit committee oversight: (1) fi-
nancial reporting, (2) internal controls to address key risks, and (3) auditor ac-
tivity [e.g., Arthur Andersen, 1998; BRC, 1999; Burke and Guy, 2001; ~t 
Thornton, 1997; KPMG, 1999; NACO, 2000; PWC, 1999; Rittenberg and Natr, 
1993]. Numerous studies and professional publications provide detailed lists of 
I This background and the discussion of the extant empirical literature focus primarily on the U.S. 
audit committee setting. As discussed later, we encourage additional research to explore the wide range of 
financial systems, corporate governance mechanisms, and audit committee practices around the world. 
-
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suggested duties within these three broad areas, and recent regulation [Sar-
banes-Oxley, 2002] specifically prescribes certain audit committee functions.2 
Both the professional and the research literature [e.g., Beasley et aI., 
1999; BRC, 1999; Lublin and MacDonald, 1998; NACO, 2000] raise questions 
about ACE in recent high-profile financial fraud cases. For example, the 
NACD [2000, p. vii] states, "with each new wave of [financial irregularities] 
the cry for more effective audit committees as an important part of the fman-
cial control system becomes even more urgent." Such concern has led to recent 
regulation of the audit committee function in a number of areas, including in-
dependence, composition, expertise, disclosure of activities, discussion of fi-
nancial reporting quality, and materiality assessment [e.g., BRC, 1999; Sar-
baneS-Oxley, 2002; SEC, 1999a; SEC, 1999b]. In addition, the major U.S. 
stock exchanges currently are proposing audit committee-related changes to 
their listing requirements. These proposals include provisions to strengthen 
audit committee independence and oversight of financial reporting. 
. However, the audit committee's ability to achieve effective o~ersight is 
inherently limited given the nature of the function. Audit committees only 
~eet periodically, usually deal with complex but limited second-hand info~a­
tlon, and include members with less knowledge of the company's operations, 
controls, and reporting than management. Despite these limitations, stake-
holders expect audit committees to provide effective oversight that protects 
their varied interests. 
3.0 AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS (ACE) 
3.1 Definition and Determinants of ACE 
ACE has been defined in many ways and in many contexts [e.g., NACO, 
~OOO; PwC, 1999; Rittenberg and Nair, 1993].3 We offer the followinl? defini-
tion of an effective audit committee as a starting point for our synthesIs of the 
ACE literature: 
An effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority 
and resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable f!-
nancial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through Its 
diligent oversight efforts. 
2 Specific duties often include reviewing financial statements and related disclosures, discussing vari-
ous financial reporting items with management and the external auditors, review.ing reports of internal an~ 
ext~"?~ auditors regarding internal control issues, overseeing th~ scope of the tnternal and external audIt 
actJvlttes, and meeting privately with the internal and external audItors. 
3 For example, the NACD [2000, p. 1] stated that the effective audit committee is one that "adds value 
to the board and the corporation." Kalbers and Fogarty (1993, p. 27] defined audit committee effectiveness 
"~ the competency with which the audit committee carries out its specified oversight responsibilities." 
RIttenberg and Nair [1993] defined an effective audit committee as one that fulfills its responsibilities. PwC 
[1999, p. 3] stated that "to be effective, an audit committee must be able to oversee the company's financial 
responsibilities without overstepping its responsibilities by becoming too involved in operational issues." 
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This defmition highlights the ultimate goal of audit cOrnID:ittee ~ervice 
(i.e., protection of stakeholder interests) as well as the manner m Whl~h the 
audit committee achieves this goal (i.e., the use of qualified members With the 
authority and resources to provide diligent oversight). Thus, we adopt a defmi-
tion that considers the input, process, and output dimensions of ACE. In addi-
tion, we extend the traditional focus on shareholders' interests (given the audit 
committee's basic fiduciary responsibility assigned by the board of directors) 
to assert that ACE should extend to a wide variety of stakeholders. 
We use this defmition, the extant audit committee literature, and the team 
effectiveness literature to develop a taxonomy for organizing the extant em-
pirical ACE literature.4 This development is limited to the extent that the em-
pirical literature focuses almost exclusively on individual audit committee 
members and their characteristics (e.g., fmancial expertise, independence), 
although audit committees are supposed to function as groups. As noted later, 
there are numerous research opportunities involving the optimal mix of audit 
committee members and the way individual audit committee members work 
together to achieve committee effectiveness. 
After considering the fundamental determinants of ACE, four di-
mensions emerge: 
• Composition - expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity 
• Authority - responsibilities, influence (derived from full board of di-
rectors, federal law, and exchange listing requirements) 
• Resources - adequate number of members; access to management, 
external auditors, and internal auditors 
• Diligence - incentive, motivation, perseverance. 
As Figure I indicates, we assert that audit committee composition, author-
ity, and resources are the basic inputs needed to achieve effectiveness. For ex-
ample, if an audit committee has independent and honest members with ade-
quate financial expertise, the authority to act, and timely access to necessary 
information, then it theoretically has a strong foundation for pursuing effec-
tiveness. Upon this foundation of inputs lies the primary process factor needed 
to achieve ACE - diligence. Audit committees that have strong composition, 
power, and resources still need the will to act IJnd to expend effort in order to 
be effective. 
4 For example, Guzzo and Shea [1992] synthesized the psychology literature on characteristics of 
effective teams and included the following elements - group composition, autonomy, nature of the task 
(related to .effort level), and motivation/accountability. From a professional perspective, Ridley and Roth 
[see FabnzlUs 1998] cited five elements of audit committee effectiveness - independence, training and re-
sources, regular meetings, review of the assessment process, and unrestricted access to auditors. Braiotta 
[1999, p. 6] focused on committee size and proper delegation of responsibility and authority as contributors 
to effectiveness, while Rittenberg and Nair [1993, p. 2] concluded that the "key to audit committee effec-
tiveness is [audit committee member] background infonnation and training." Similarly, McMullen and 
Raghunandan [1996, p. 79] described the need for audit committees to be "independent, infonned and vigi-
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(e.g., Access To Management, 
Extemal and Intemal Auditors 
3.2 Composition 
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The major U.S. stock exchanges require that audit committees be com-
posed of at least three independent, fmancially literate directors, one of whom 
must have accounting or related fmancial-management expertise. Each stock 
exchange provides a definition of independence and makes it clear that a sim-
ple "insider/outsider" dichotomization is inadequate. The ultimate objective of 
such stock exchange requirements is to enable audit committees to make 
judgments that are in the best interests of shareholders (i.e., independence is 
required so as to promote objectivity on the part of audit commi~ee me~bers~. 
The exchanges currently are in process of further strengiliemng therr audit 
committee-related listing requirements. For example, the NYSE has proposed 
tighter independence requirements and more expansive audit committee duties, 
such as reviewing financial press releases and communications with analysts. 
Similarly, AMEX and NASDAQ have proposed tighter independence and fi-
nancial expertise requirements. 
Team (group) issues also are relevant when considering audit committee 
composition. For example, a number of leadership issues emerge when consid-
ering how audit committees function. While the audit committee chair often 
assumes a leadership role, other leaders and dominant personalities can emerge 
in a way that impacts ACE. For example, a member with a dominant personal-
ity, but limited financial oversight ability, could monopolize meeting time and 
prevent the audit committee from functioning effectively. In such a case, the 
audit committee chair would need to firmly bring the audit committee back to 
its primary tasks. Alternatively, some audit committees may rely too heavily 
on one financial expert such that the other committee members add little value 
or fail to address issues themselves. 
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3.3 Authority 
The audit committee derives its authority from the full board of directors, 
federal law, and exchange listing requirements. For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act [2002] requires public company audit committees to be "directly 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work" of 
. the external auditor. The Act also states that audit committees have the author-
ity to hire outside counselor other necessary advisors and requires external 
auditors to discuss a number of issues with the audit committee. 
We view authority as a function of the audit committee's responsibilities 
and influence. The Public Oversight Board noted "in too many instances the 
audit committees do not perform their duties adequately and in many cases do 
not understand their responsibilities" [1993, p. 50]. To address this problem, 
many groups provide guidance designed to help audit committees understand 
their responsibilities and to pursue ACE [e.g., Burke and Guy, 2001; Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; MacDonald Commission, 1987; NACD, 2000; Treadway 
Commission, 1987]. 
The audit committee charter has become an increasingly important docu-
ment for helping audit committee members focus on their specific responsibili-
ties and for helping stakeholders assess the role and responsibilities of the au-
dit committee [KPMG, 2000; SEC, 1999b]. Companies listed on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ now are required to include the audit committee char-
ter in their proxy statement at least once every three years. 
Audit committee authority (influence) also depends on the audit commit-
tee's relationships with management, external and internal auditors, and the 
board as a whole. For example, external audit standards [e.g., AICPA, 2000] 
provide audit committees with great authority because they require auditors to 
communicate with audit committees on issues including detected fraud and 
illegal acts, disagreements with management, and materiality. 
3.4 Resources 
The resource component of ACE highlights that effective oversight is 
contingent upon the audit committee having adequate resources to do its job. 
The NACD [2000, p. 13] discussed three keys to an effective audit committee 
oversight process - "sufficient resources, meetings, and relationships." We 
posit that the resources needed by audit committees to achieve ACE include an 
adequate number of committee members to generate substantive discussion 
and to consider emerging issues, as well as access to management, external 
auditors, internal auditors, the full board, and legal counsel. 
With respect to audit committee size, the NACD's Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion on Audit Committees [NACD, 2000] recommended that between three 
and six members comprise an audit committee. The BRC [1999, p. 12] rec-
ommended and major U.S. stock exchanges now require audit committees 
"comprised of a minimum of three directors." 
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In tenns <;,f access to other corporate governance groups, it is difficult to 
overstate the unportance of easy access to forthright infonnation from man-
agement, external auditors, internal auditors, and legal counsel. ACE is much 
more likely in environments where audit committees have access to accurate, 
timely and complete updates from management and auditors on changes in 
significant accounting and auditing regulations, changes in the company's core 
businesses, and current trends in corporate governance [Beasley et aI., 1999; 
NACO, 2000]. 
3.5 Diligence 
As noted earlier, composition, authority, and resources represent the three 
primary inputs to ACE, while diligence is the process factor that is needed to 
achieve ACE (see Figure 1). Similarly, Kalbers and Fogarty [1993] highlighted 
that the audit committee member's will to act is arguably the most important 
ACE attribute. Audit committees must be diligent in working to serve the best 
interests of stakeholders. Diligence refers to the willingness of committee 
members to work together as needed to prepare, ask questions, and pursue an-
swers when dealing with management, external auditors, internal auditors, and 
other relevant constituents. 
The accounting literature includes numerous calls for audit committee 
diligence [e.g., Beasley et aI., 1999; BRC, 1999; Horton et aI., 2000; Sommer, 
1991]. For example, the BRC (1999] recommended that audit committees meet 
at least quarterly, discuss fmancial reporting quality with the external. a~ditor, 
and provide up-to-date charters detailing committee responsibilitie~. Sumlarly, 
the NACD [2000] emphasized the importance of diligence when It suggested 
that audit committees have four half-day meetings each year. 
4.0 SYNTHESIS OF THE EXTANT AUDIT COMMITTEE LITERA-
TURE 
We believe that the four-component ACE description above provides a 
basis for evaluating the extant empirical audit committee literature. Accord-
ingly, we synthesize the literature by evaluating research contributions related 
to the composition, authority, resources, and diligence of audit committees and 
their members. Such a synthesis of the literature should facilitate an under-
standing of the empirical audit committee literature and provide a structured 
means for identifying future research needs and opportunities.5 
4.1 Composition 
One of the most common variables in the audit committee composition 
literature is member independence. This area includes studies that focus solely 
5 Our literature review focuses on published empirical studies in accounting and does not attempt to 
integrate the vast non-empirical (qualitative) literature involving audit committees. In addition, we do not 
review the extensive literature on audit committee existence or formation [e.g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow et 
oJ., 1996; Eichenseher and Shields, 1985; McMullen, 1996; Pincus et oJ., 1989; Wild, 1996]. Given current 
requirements in the U.S., audit committee existence is assumed. 
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on inside and outside directors [e ~g., Collier and Gregory, 1999; Menon and 
Williams, 1994] and studies that consider "grey" area directors who are not 
insiders but still have ties to management or the corporation [e.g., Carcello and 
Neal, 2000; Vafeas, 2001]. 
A number of independence studies [e.g., Abbott and Parker, 2000; Ar-
chambeault and DeZoort, 2001 ; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Raghunand~ et aI., 
2001; Scarbrough et aI., 1998] focus on the impact of independent audIt com-
mittees on the audit function. For example, Abbott and Parker [2000] found that 
audit committees without any insider members were more likely to use industry 
specialist external auditors. This may reflect such audit committees' desire to 
enhance audit quality. Archambeault and DeZoort [2001] found that companies 
with "suspicious auditor switches" (changed auditors after disclosure of a re-
portable event, after receiving a modified audit opinion, or after other recent 
auditor switches) had a smaller percentage of independent directors on the audit 
committee than did companies without suspicious auditor switches. Both 
Raghunandan et al. [2001] and Scarbrough et al. [1998] reported survey results 
indicating that audit committees composed only of independent directors were 
more likely to have stronger relationships with internal auditors than were audit 
committees with one or more insiders. 
Other studies highlight the link between audit committee member inde-
pendence and fraudulent financial reporting or the informativeness / quality of 
earnings. Abbott et aI. [2000] found that companies with audit committees 
composed of independent directors were less likely to be sanctioned by the 
SEC for fraudulent or misleading fmancial reporting. Similarly, Beasley et al. 
[2000] found that fraud companies had less independent audit committees than 
no-fraud industry benchmarks. McMullen and Raghunandan [1996] found that 
companies with reporting problems were less likely to have audit committees 
composed solely of outside directors. Klein [2002b] found that audit commit-
tee independence was negatively associated with abnormal accruals and that 
reductions in audit committee independence were associated with large in-
creases in abnormal accruals. 
Other studies relate audit committee independence to governance and 
company variables. Beasley and Salterio [2001] found that voluntary increases 
in the number of outside audit committee members were associated with board 
size, board independence, and the separation of the CEO and board chair roles. 
Klein [2002a] found that audit committee independence was positively associ-
ated with board size and board independence and negatively associated with 
growth opportunities and firms with accounting losses. 
The independence literature extends beyond simple dichotomization 
(where directors are either "insiders" or "outsiders") to consider directors with 
various non-management relationships with the company. Since Vicknair et al. 
[1993] highlighted the potential grey area director/member issue, a number of 
studies have expanded their study of audit committee member independence to 
include grey area directors. For example, Carcello and Neal [2000] studied 
fmancially distressed companies and found a negative association between the 
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percentage of affiliated (insiders or grey) directors on the audit committee and 
the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion. Vafeas [2001] used a rela-
tively broad approach to defining grey directors in his study of audit commit-
tee appointments. Using an independence measure that screened directors who 
were consultants, bank officers, lawyers, relatives of management, or other-
wise had any economic link to the company, he found that new audit commit-
tee appointees were more independent than a control group of non-audit com-
mittee directors. 
The audit committee composition literature involving member expertise 
developed initially with a number of surveys and archival studies [e.g., Beasley 
and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort, 1997; GAO, 1991 ; Kalbers, 1992a, 1992b; Lee 
and Stone, 1997]. The relatively large number of studies in this area suggests 
the importance of audit committee member expertise (and its underlying di-
mensions) as a necessary component of ACE. The results also indicate great 
variation in expertise within and among audit committees, and that many 
members lack adequate experience and expertise in relevant oversight areas. 
From the survey literature, a number of studies have focused on audit 
committee members' perceptions of their own expertise. For example, the 
GAO [1991] found that approximately half of the 40 surveyed audit committee 
chairs from large U.S. banks perceived their audit committee had no members 
with expertise in assigned accounting, auditing, banking, and legal oversight 
domains. DeZoort [1997] found that audit committee members believed that 
all audit committee members should have sufficient expertise in oversight ar-
eas related to accounting, auditing, and the law. 
Other studies reveal other stakeholders' opinions about audit committee 
member expertise. The Raghunandan et al. [200 I] survey of chief internal 
auditors (CIAs) revealed perceptions that audit committees with at least one 
member possessing an accounting or fmance background were more likely: (I) 
to have longer meetings with CIAs, (2) to provide private access to CIAs, and 
(3) to review internal audit proposals and results. Kalbers [1992a, 1992b] s~r­
veyed external auditors and internal auditors and found both groups had sIg-
nificantly lower opinions of audit committee members' expertise in oversight 
areas than did participating audit committee members. 
In addition to the survey literature, the archival literature addresses a wide 
variety of research questions involving member expertise. ~cham?eault and 
DeZoort [2001] found that companies with suspicious audlt~r sWltc.h~s had 
fewer audit committee members with experience in accountmg, audltmg, or 
fmance than their non-switching counterparts. Beasley and Salterio [2001] 
studied Canadian boards and found that voluntary increases in audit committee 
members' collective financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and 
experience were related to board size, proportion of outsiders on the board, 
and separation of board chair and CEO/president. Lee and Stone [1997] stud-
ied 100 U.S. multinational companies and described a mismatch between audit 
committees' stated responsibilities and the levels of instrumental experience 
(defined as skills related to accounting, auditing, and control issues) among 
members. McMullen and Raghunandan [1996] found that companies with fi-
nancial reporting problems were less likely to have CPAs on the audit commit-
tee. 
Table 1 
"'" Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Independence QO 
Companies/ 
Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
Klein [2002a] Archival 803 firm-years Financial Audit committee independence was positively associated with 
on S&P 500 reporting board size and board independence and negatively associated with 
growth opportunities and firms with losses. 
Klein [2002b J Archival 692 firm-years Financial Audit committee independence was negatively associated with ab- ~ 
on S&P 500 reporting normal accruals, and reductions in audit committee independence ~ 
were associated with large increases in abnormal accruals. ~ 
Archambeault and Archival Companies that made suspicious auditor switches had a smaller ~ 30 cos with sus- Auditor ::t... 
DeZoort [200 I J picious auditor switching percentage of independent audit committee members than matched g 
switches non-switching counterparts. ;: ::s 
... 
Beasley and Archival 627 pubJicly- Voluntary Voluntary increases in number of outside audit committee members 
~. 
t-< 
Salterio [200 I ] traded Canadian improvements was positively related to board size, proportion of outsiders on the ::;: III 
cos in audit board, and separation of board chair and CEO/president. tl ~ 
committee ~ 
composition 
Raghunandan et Survey 114 chief inter- Access to Audit committees with only independent directors and at least one 
al. [2001J nal auditors internal audi- member with an accounting or finance background were more 
(CIAs) tors likely to have longer meetings with CIAs, to provide private access 
to CIAs, and to review internal audit proposals and results. 
<: Vafeas [2001] Archival 262 non- Audit com- New audit committee members generally had fewer years of service 0 
executive AC mitteemem- on the board, served on fewer board committees, and were more [ 
. members ber selection independent than the control group of other non-audit committee 
(Ij 
N 
directors. Audit committee appointments were not significantly -
related to stock ownership and the number of other directorships 
held. 
--
Table 1 - (Continued) N 0 
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Independence 0 N 
Companies! 
Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
Abbott et al. Archival 78 pairs of fraud Fraudulent Companies with audit committees composed of independent direc-
[2000] and no-fraud cos financial re- tors were less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent or ~ 
porting misleading financial reporting. ~ 
<::> 
<::> 
Abbot and Parker Archival 500NYSE, Auditor selec- Companies with audit committees that did not include employee ;t 
[2001] AMEX,or tion members were more likely to use specialist auditors. ~ 
NASDAQ cos ~ 
Beasley et al. Archival 66 fraud cos in 
a 
Fraudulent Fraud companies in technology, healthcare, and financial services <::> 
,:lI 
[2000] three industry financial re- industries had less independent audit committees than the industry ::to.. 
groups porting benchmarks. In addition, fraud companies had a lower percentage .... 9-
of audit committees composed of all outside directors than did no- ~ 
fraud companies. ~ II) 
I:) 
t: 
Carcello and Neal Archival 223 financially Audit (going The greater the percentage of affiliated (inside or grey) directors on ~ 
[2000] distressed cos concern opin- the audit committee, the lower the probability that a fmancially ~ 
ion) distressed firm will receive a going concern opinion from the audi- t). 
tor. 
Collier and Survey and 141 U.K cos Audit com- Presence of insiders on the audit committee was negatively related 
Gregory [1999] Archival mittee meet- to the level of annual audit committee activity (number of meetings 
ing activity and duration of meetings). 
~ 
I,C) 
Table 1 - (Continued) VI 0 
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Independence 
Companies/ 
Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
Scarborough et al. Survey 72 chief internal Internal audit Audit committees consisting solely of non-employee directors were 
[1998J auditors (CIAs) access more likely to (1) meet frequently with the CIA and (2) review in-
from Canada ternal audit programs and results of internal audits than were audit 
committees comprised of one or more insiders. ~ 
McMullen and Archival 51 cos with re- Financial Companies with financial reporting problems were less likely to ~ ~ 
-Raghunandam porting problems reporting have audit committees composed entirely of outside directors. 
..a. [1996] problems ::t.. g 
Menon and Archival 200 randomly Board rell- Audit committee independence is a proxy for the board's reliance ~ ::s 
... 
Williams [1994] selected OTC ance on the on the audit committee. As the proportion of outside directors on ~. 
cos audit commit- the board increases, firms are more likely to exclude insiders from t'-< 
tee the audit committee. ; Vicknair et al. Archival 100NYSE cos Audit com- A significant presence of "grey" area directors was noted on the 
[1993] mittee mem- audit committees of the sample companies. Specifically, interlock-
ber independ- ing directorships and other related party transactions constituted the 
ence most prevalent sources of independence questions. 
l 
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Despite the inherent challenge of accessing audit committee member sub-
jects, experimental research involving member expertise is emerging to sup-
plement the extant survey and archival literature. As with the literature involv-
ing auditor expertise, the experimental literature involving audit committee 
member expertise started with tests for experience effects. For example, De-
Zoort [1998] evaluated how general domain and task-specific experience affect 
audit committee members' internal control judgments. His fmdings indicated 
that committee members with experience made internal control judgments 
more like criterion group auditors than did members without experience. In 
addition, members with experience made more consistent judgments and had 
higher self-insight and consensus than did the members without experience. 
Beyond studies of experience, the experimental literature is starting to 
evolve to consider other dimensions of expertise (e.g., knowledge and ability), 
with an emphasis on studying audit committee member affiliation in auditor-
management disputes. DeZoort and Salterio [200 I ] conducted an experiment 
examining the effects of experience and knowledge on audit committee mem-
ber affiliation in an auditor-management dispute case. Their results revealed 
that independent director experience and audit knowledge were positively as-
sociated with audit committee member support for an auditor in a "substance 
over form" dispute. Conversely, concurrent experience as a board director and 
a senior member of management was positively associated with support for 
management. Financial accounting knowledge and problem-solving ability 
were not significantly related to support for either the auditor or management. 
McDaniel et al. [2002] conducted an experiment using audit firm man~g­
ers and executive MBA graduates to assess differences in the way fmanclal 
experts and financial literates evaluate financial reporting quality. They fo"?d 
that experts tended to focus more on recurring, less-prominent issues, whIle 
literates focused more on nonrecurring, prominent issues. The au~ors con-
clude that efforts to enhance audit committee fmancial expertise may mfluence 
audit committees' assessments of financial reporting quality. 
Several consistent patterns emerge from the literature on audit con;unittee 
composition. Audit committee independence is associated with (a) audit com-
mittees engaging higher quality auditors, interacting more with internal audi-
tors, and protecting the external auditor from client pressure; and (b) a reduced 
incidence of financial reporting problems. Thus, the literature indicates sig-
nificant benefits associated with audit committee independence. 
In addition, audit committee experience/expertise is perceived to be a 
critical component of ACE, yet many parties have concerns with audit commit-
tee members' expertise levels. Audit committee experience/expertise is associ-
ated with factors including (a) greater interaction with internal auditors, (b) 
reduced incidence of fmancial reporting problems, and (c) greater support for 
auditors in auditor-management disagreements. The benefits of audit commit-
tee member experience/expertise are very similar to those described for inde-
pendence above. 
There are several limitations of the extant research on audit committee 
composition. First, evaluations of member independence or expertise largely 
are based on publicly available proxies (e.g., prior job titles, certifications, 
Table 2 VI N 
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Expertise 
Companies! 
Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
McDaniel et al. Experiment 20 audit manag- Financial When evaluating financial reporting quality, financial experts 
[2002] ers and 18 ex- reporting tended to focus more on recurring, less-prominent issues, while 
ecutive MBA quality financial literates focused more on nonrecurring, prominent issues. 
graduates ~ 
s:: 
Archambeault and Archival 30 cos with sus- Auditor Companies that made suspicious auditor switches had fewer audit ~ 5:.. DeZoort [200 I ] picious auditor switching committee members with experience in accounting, auditing, or ~ switches finance than matched non-switching companies. ~ 
~ 
Beasley and Voluntary increases in the breadth of outside audit committee mem- o Archival 627 publicly- Voluntary s:: :: 
Salterio [200 I ] traded Canadian improvements bers' collective financial reporting and audit committee knowledge S· 
cos in audit and experience were positively related to board size, proportion of ()Q t--
committee outsiders on the board, and separation of board chair and :::-. ~ 
composition CEO/president. t) ~ 
DeZoort and Independent director experience and audit knowledge were associ- ~ Survey 68 Canadian AC Financial 
Salterio [2001] members reporting dis- ated with audit committee member support for an auditor who ad-
pute vocates a "substance over form" approach in a dispute with client 
management. 
Raghunandan et Survey 114 chief inter- Internal audit Audit committees with at least one member with an accounting or <: 
al. [2001] nal auditors access finance background were more likely to have longer meetings with ~ (CIAs) CIAs, provide private access to CIAs, and review internal audit 
proposals and results. ~ N 
Table 2 - (Continued) 




Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
DeZoort [1998] Experiment 87 AC members Internal con- Audit committee members with auditing and internal control 
fromNYSE, trol evalua- evaluation experience made internal control judgments more like 
AMEX,and tion experts than members who lacked such experience. .\:::l 
NASDAQ cos '" .~ 
DeZoort [1997] Survey 112 AC mem- Audit com- Audit committee members recognized the importance of having ~ .:--
bers from NYSE, mittee re- expertise in accounting, auditing, and law, with some members ~ 
AMEX,and sponsibilities admitting they lacked sufficient expertise in these areas. Internal ~ 
NASDAQ cos control evaluation was consistently ranked as the most important ~ 
oversight responsibility. c 
.::s 
:A. 
Lee and Stone Archival 100 U.S. multi- Audit com- Results indicate a mismatch between stated audit committee re- ., g. 
[1997] national cos mittee re- sponsibilities and the level of audit committee member "instrumen- ~ 
sponsibilities tal" experience (related to accounting, auditing, and control issues). c::J-
'" I:l ~ 
McMullen and Archival 51 cos with fi- Financial Companies with financial reporting problems were less likely to F:" 
Raghunandan nancial reporting reporting have CPAs on the audit committee ~ 
'" '" [1996] problems problems I:l. 
Kalbers [1992a] Survey 50 external audi- Audit com- External auditors had significantly lower opinions of audit commit-
tors and 52 AC mittee re- tee members' expertise in oversight areas than did audit committee 





Kalbers [I 992b] Survey 
GAO [1991] Survey 
Table 2 - (Continued) 
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Expertise 
Companies/ 
Subjects 
61 chief internal 
auditors and 52 
ACmembers 
40 AC chairs 








Internal auditors had significantly lower opinions of audit commit-
tee members' expertise in oversight areas than did audit committee 
members. 
Approximately half of the audit committee chairs indicated that 
their committee lacked members with expertise in assigned over-
sight areas related to accounting, auditing, banking, and the law. 
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etc.), rather than on more complete assessments of independent thinking and 
true expertise in fmance, accounting, or other relevant domains. Second, di-
mensions of composition such as integrity and objectivity have not been ex-
plored. Finally, research to date has left team/group issues faced by audit 
committees virtually unaddressed. 
Going forward, we believe that it is critical to enhance the richness of 
measures of audit committee member independence, expertise, integrity, and 
objectivity. In addition, group issues represent a fruitful area of research. Spe-
cific avenues for future research are offered in the concluding section of the 
paper. 
4.2 Authority 
A number of studies highlight the authority dimension of ACE. This area 
of the literature reflects strong emphasis on audit committee oversight respon-
sibilities and focuses heavily on survey methods. In general, the fmdings indi-
cate a great deal of variation in both perceived and stated responsibilities [e.g., 
Abdolmohammadi and Levy, 1992; Coopers & Lybrand, 1995; DeZoort, 1997; 
Kalbers, 1992a] and the need to better understand responsibilities to improve 
ACE [e.g., Rittenberg and Nair, 1993]. 
Coopers & Lybrand [1995] provided evidence suggesting that the scope of 
audit committee activity had expanded considerably over the two decades prior 
to the study. The survey results also revealed that most of the sampled audit 
committees conducted a wide range of oversight duties. DeZoort [1997] sur-
veyed audit committee members' perceptions of their responsibilities in areas 
related to financial reporting, auditing, and overall corporate governance. 
Members consistently ranked internal control evaluation as the most important 
oversight area, with fmancial statement review and internal auditor/external 
auditor evaluation considered highly important. Lee and Stone [1997] indicate 
a mismatch between stated audit committee responsibilities and the level of 
audit committee member instrumental experience (i.e., skills in accounting, 
auditing, and control issues). 
A number of studies move beyond evaluating specific audit committee 
responsibilities. Haka and Chalos [1990] surveyed audit committee chairs, 
management, external auditors, and internal auditors about their perceptions of 
agency conflict. Their findings support the existence of agency conflict be-
tween audit committees and management in areas related to fmancial disclo-
sure and discretionary accounting procedures. Audit committee chairs' opin-
ions about issues affecting accounting choices also differed from opinions 
provided by external auditors and internal auditors. 
Kalbers and Fogarty [1993] surveyed audit committee members from 90 
corporations to investigate the relation between audit committee power and 
ACE. The results of their analysis indicated that effectiveness included over-
sight of fmancial reporting, external auditors and internal control. Audit com-
mittee power within the organization came from a combination of written au-
thority and the clear support of top management. 
Table 3 VI 
Authority Studies 0\ 
Companies! 
Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
DeZoort [1997] Survey 112AC mem- Financial Audit committee members appreciated the importance of having 
bers, from reporting, expertise in accounting, auditing, and law, although some members 
NYSE,AMEX, auditing, and admitted to a lack of sufficient expertise in these areas. Internal 
and NASDAQ corporate control evaluation was consistently ranked as the most important 
cos governance oversight responsibility. ~ 
s:: 
Lee and Stone Archival 100 U.S. multi- Financial Results indicated a mismatch between stated AC responsibilities ~ ~ 
-[1997] national cos reporting, and the level of audit committee member instrumental experience ~ 
auditing, and (Le., skills in accounting, auditing, and control issues). ~ ~ 
corporate 8 
s:: governance :::s ... 
~. 
Coopers & Survey Members from Audit com- The scope of audit committee activity expanded considerably over to-< 
Lybrand [1995] 250 ACs mittee re- the two decades prior to the study, and most of the sampled audit I sponsibilities committees conducted a wide range of oversight duties. (\> 
Kalbers and Survey EAs, lAs, and Audit com- Audit committee effectiveness included oversight of financial re-
Fogarty [1993] CFOs from 90 mittee and porting, external auditors and internal control. Audit committee 
U.S. cos power power within the organization came from a combination of written 
authority and the clear support of top management. 
Rittenberg and Survey 62 AC members, Audit com- Many members recognized that they needed to better understand <: Nair [1993] 94 CPAs, and 42 mittee charac- their specific responsibilities. 0 





and Levy [1992] 
Kalbers [1992a] Survey 




69 AC members 
50 external audi-





and AC chairs 
from Fortune 
500 cos 












Although audit committee members had varied perceptions of their 
responsibilities, several broad areas emerged, including oversight, 
relationship with external auditors, relationship with internal audi-
tors, and financial disclosure. 
Audit committee members and auditors disagreed with the sugges-
tion that the audit committee has very little authority, although au-
dit committee members disagreed more than auditors. 
Management and audit committee chairs had significant differences 
in perceptions about financial statement disclosure and accounting 
procedure choice. 
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A few themes are evident in this area of the literature. First, audit commit-
tee responsibilities are diverse and appear to be expanding. Second, key areas 
for audit committee oversight typically include oversight of fmancial report-
ing, auditing, and controls. Finally, audit committee authority is related to writ-
ten authority and management support. 
This literature has several limitations. First, no research appears to have 
addressed the ultimate source of the audit committee's authority - the board of 
directors - or factors associated with variations in such authority. Second, the 
association between ACE and audit committee authority is relatively unexam-
ined. 
Going forward, we believe that it is important to track the expansion of 
specific audit committee responsibilities, whether due to legislation, regula-
tion, or market forces. We also encourage research on the degree of board 
delegation to the audit committee (and variations in such delegation), as well 
as research exploring the relation between ACE and audit committee authority. 
4.3 Resources 
Research involving the resource component of ACE has focused on sup-
port from the external and internal audit functions, and on the size of the audit 
committee. A number of studies [e.g., Cohen and Ranno, 2000; Knapp, 1987, 
1991; Schroeder et aI., 1986] highlight the importance of the external auditor 
in pursuing ACE. Knapp [1987] found that the use of a Big 8 audit finn was 
associated with increased audit committee support for the auditor in auditor-
management disagreements. This fmding is consistent with the notion that au-
dit quality and auditor credibility are associated with audit finn size. A follow-
up study [Knapp, 1991] revealed that audit committee members perceived Big 
8 firms to be more likely to discover material errors than local firms. In addi-
tion, members believed that length of auditor tenure was positively related to 
audit quality in early engagement years, but negatively related to audit quality 
in later years. 
More recently, Cohen and Ranno [2000] found that external auditors 
made less favorable audit planning judgments in cases where the corporate 
governance structure included an audit committee that lacked technical experi-
ence and regular access to internal and external auditors without top manage-
ment present. In addition, Cohen et at. [2002] interviewed practicing auditors 
and found that auditors viewed corporate governance as centered around man-
agement, rather than the board. The auditors viewed corporate governance 
considerations as particularly important in client acceptance decisions and in 
international settings, and many of the auditors viewed audit committees as 
weak and ineffective. 
Our review of the resource literature also highlights the specific impor-
tance of the internal audit function in achieving ACE. For example, Raghu-
nandan et at. [2001] link audit committee member independence and expertise 
to influence with internal auditors via private access to chief internal auditors, 
amount of meeting time with chief internal auditors, and ability to review in-
ternal audit activities and results. KPMG's Audit Committee Institute [2001] 
d 
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evaluated audit committee members' perceptions about effective use of the 
int~rn~l a~dit function. In a series of surveys, the Institute found a great deal of 
vanatlon m the nature and extent of audit committees' reviews of reports de-
veloped by internal auditors. In addition, audit committee members tended to 
agree that internal auditors are "well equipped" to identify material weak-
nesses in internal controls. The results in Beasley et al. [2000] indicated that 
fraud companies in technology, healthcare, and financial services industries 
had less internal audit support than no-fraud industry benchmarks. Raghunan-
dan and McHugh [1994] found that audit committee involvement in the hiring 
and firing of the chief internal auditor was associated with the number of meet-
ings with the internal audit head. Finally, the results in DeZoort et al. [2000] 
revealed that internal audit directors believe structured communications pro-
grams between internal auditors and audit committees could improve the qual-
ity of corporate governance. 
Beyond focus on auditors as resources for the audit committee, Archam-
beault and DeZoort [2001] evaluated the impact of audit committee size on 
suspicious auditor switching. They found that companies with suspicious audi-
tor switches had smaller audit committees than companies without suspicious 
auditor switches. 
The overriding conclusion from the audit committee resource literature is 
that support from the external and internal auditors is vital to ACE. Higher 
quality external auditors are associated with increased audit committee support 
for the auditor in auditor-management disagreements, and external auditors 
appear to focus on ACE-related factors when assessing risk or accepting new 
clients. Several studies suggest the unique importance of internal audit support 
and interaction in promoting ACE, including the association between internal 
audit support and reduced incidence of financial statement fraud. 
A key limitation of this area of research is that two arguably critical audit 
committee resources - information and outside advisors - have not been di-
rectly addressed. Interaction with auditors is a proxy for the quality of informa-
tion provided to the audit committee, but it is not a perfect proxy. We encour-
age research that examines the quality of the audit committee's information set 
and how this affects ACE. In addition, with the ever-increasing responsibilities 
placed on audit committees, many are arguing that audit committees should 
engage outside experts to assist them (much as compensation committees typi-
cally engage compensation and benefits consultants). Research exploring the 
advantages and disadvantages of such an approach is warranted, as is work on 
the Sarbanes-Oxley [2002] provision that specifically grants audit committees 
the authority to hire such advisors. 
4.4 Diligence 
While a number of studies appear in this area, they tend to focus narrowly 
on the most common proxy for audit committee diligence: the number of audit 
committee meetings per year. To the extent that actual diligence is difficult to 
measure, the relative lack of variation in approach is understandable. A few 






Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
Cohen et al. Interview 36 auditors External au- Auditors viewed corporate governance as centered around man-
[2002] diting agement, rather than the board. Auditors viewed corporate govern-
ance considerations as particularly important in client acceptance 
decisions and in international settings. Finally, many of the auditors 
viewed audit committees as weak and ineffective. 
Archambeault and Archival 30 cos with sus- Auditor Companies that made suspicious auditor switches had smaller audit ~ 
DeZoort [2001] picious auditor switching committees than matched companies without suspicious auditor I:! .... 





Raghunandan et Survey 114 chief inter- Internal audit Audit committees with only independent members and at least one g 
al. [2001] nal auditors member with an accounting or finance background were more I:! ;::os 
... 
(CIAs) likely to have longer meetings with CIAs, private access to CIAs, ~. 
and review internal audit proposals and results. t-< 
::::: 
Beasley et al. Archival 66 fraud cos in Fraudulent Fraud companies in technology, healthcare, and financial services ~ ... 
[2000] three industries financial re- industries had less internal audit support than industry benchmarks. ~ 
porting 
Cohen and Hanno Experiment 96 external audi- Auditor reten- Auditor planning judgments were affected by the strength of the 
[2000] tors tion and audit corporate governance structure. Companies with audit committees 
planning that lacked resources and technical experience were more likely to 
receive unfavorable audit planning judgments from auditors. <: 
0 
DeZoort et al. Survey 18 internal audit Audit com- Internal audit directors suggested that structured communications r [2000] directors mitteemem- programs between internal auditors and audit committees could N 
her training improve the quality of corporate governance. 
Table 4 - (Continued) 




Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
Raghunandan and Survey 426 chief inter- Internal audit Audit committees that were involved in chief internal auditor hir-
McHugh [1994] nal auditors ing/firing decisions met more often with the chief internal auditor 
and were perceived to have greater ability to get management to act t;:, 
on auditing findings. ~ c 
~ 
,:-. 
Knapp [1991] Experiment 122 AC mem- External audit Audit committee members perceived that the quality of audit ser- ~ bers from cos in quality vice provided is significantly related to auditor size and auditor ~ Texas tenure. Exposure to different size audit firms moderated the audit ~ size effect. The perceived positive effects of auditor tenure in early ~ engagement years became negative in subsequent years. 
:t.. 
Knapp [1987] Experiment 179 AC mem- Auditor-client Big 8 audit firm use was associated with increased support for the g. 
bers disagreement auditor in auditor-management disagreements. In addition, mem- ~ Cl-
on subsequent bers were less likely to support the auditor when the members were ~ 
event disclo- not corporate managers, when the auditee was in strong financial Ii:: ~ 
sure and ma- condition, and when objective professional standards were absent. ~ teriality level ~ 
of proposed 
adjustment 
Schroeder et al. Survey 81 Fortune 500 External audit Audit committee chairs perceived audit team factors (e.g., the 
(1986] company AC quality amount of partner and manager attention on the aUdit) to be more 
chairs and 41 important than audit firm factors (e.g., relative fee size) when it 
Big 8 firm part- came to audit quality. 
0\ ners 
-
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Several studies using the meeting frequency prox~ deal w!th fraudulent 
fmancial reporting. Beasley et al. [2000] found that audit committees of fra~d 
companies in the technology and healthcare industries met less often ~an did 
audit committees in comparable companies without reported fraud. The~ study 
indicated that fraud companies generally only met once per year while ?o-
fraud companies met two or three times each year. However, when reportmg 
this difference, the authors (p. 450) noted that even the no-fraud companies' 
two or three meetings per year were "still below the NACD [2000] sugg~s­
tion." Similarly, the results in Abbott et al. [2000] indicated that firms With 
audit committees that met at least twice per year were less likely to be sanc-
tioned by the SEC for financial reporting problems. Finally, McMullen and 
Raghunandan [1996] found that companies with reporting problems had less 
frequent audit committee meetings. 
Some studies link the number of meetings with external auditor selection. 
Abbott and Parker [2000] studied auditor selection for 500 companies and 
found that firms with audit committees that met at least twice per year were 
more likely to use specialist auditors. Archambeault and DeZoort [2001] found 
that companies making suspicious auditor switches held fewer audit committee 
meetings than companies without suspicious auditor switches. 
. The literature involving meeting frequency also extends to consider inter-
actions with other audit committee and company variables. For example, 
Men0l'! and Williams [1994] studied 200 companies and found that the number 
?f audit committee meetings increased as the percentage of outside directors 
mcreased. In addition, meeting frequency was associated with firm size, sug-
gesting positive associations among company size, monitoring complexity, and 
the need for audit committee meetings. Similarly, Collier and Gregory [1999] 
used .two ~easures of audit committee activity (Le., number and duration of 
meetmgs) m their study <;>f U.K. companies. Their results indicated that the 
presence of a dominant CEO and the inclusion of insiders on the audit commit-
tee were ne~atively related to the level of activity, while leverage and the pres-
ence of a Big 6 auditor were positively associated with the level of activity. 
A few published studies have used different proxies for diligence. Kalbers 
and Fogarty [1993] measured chief financial officers', chief internal auditors', 
and external audit partners' perceptions of audit committee diligence, defmed 
as t?e level ?f preparation, vigilance, independence, and level of activity of the 
audit committee chair and other members. Their LISREL analysis revealed a 
significant positive relationship between diligence and perceived ACE. 
Alternatively, Turpin and DeZoort [1998] evaluated voluntary disclosure 
of an audit committee report in annual reports and found significant positive 
associations between voluntary disclosure of audit committee reports and com-
pany size, proportion of outside directors, leverage, and trade on a major stock 
exchange. However, their results also indicated that management, not the audit 
committee, tended to drive the decision for such voluntary audit committee 
disclosure. In addition Carcello et al. [2002] analyzed voluntary audit 
committee disclosures under the new disclosure rules implemented in 2001. 
They found voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities to be more 
common for depository institutions, larger companies, NYSE-listed compa-
nies, and companies with more independent audit committees. 
Table 5 




Study Method Subjects Domain Results 
Carcello et aI. Archival 150 public com- Audit com- Voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities was more com-
[2002] panies on NYSE, mittee disclo- mon for depository institutions, larger companies, NYSE-listed 
NASDAQ,or . sure companies, and companies with more independent audit commit-
AMEX tees. tl ~ 0 
Archambeault and Archival 30 cos with sus- Auditor Companies that made suspicious auditor switches held fewer audit ~ 
.:--
DeZoort [2001] picious auditor switching committee meetings than matched companies without suspicious ~ switches auditor switches. ~ 
Abbott et al. Archival 78 fraud and no- Fraudulent Firms with audit committees that met at least twice per year were a ~ [2000] frauc cos financial re- less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent or misleading ~ porting financial reporting. ." g.. 
Abbott and Parker Archival 500NYSE, Auditor selec- Firms with audit committees that met at least twice per year were ~ 
"'" [2000] AMEX,and tion more likely to use specialist auditors. ~ NASDAQ cos ~ 
~ Beasley et al. Archival 66 fraud cos in Fraudulent Fraud companies in the technology and healthcare industries held II> ~ [2000] three industries financial re- fewer audit committees meetings than industry benchmarks. 
porting 
Collier and Greg- Survey and 141 U.K. cos Meeting ac- Presence of a dominant CEO and insiders on the audit committee 
ory [1999] Archival tivity were negatively related to the level of annual audit committee activ-
ity (number of meetings and duration of meetings). Presence ofa 
Big 6 auditor and leverage were positively associated with the level 0-
of annual audit committee activity. t..J 
Companies/ 
Study Method Subject 
Turpin and Archival 33 cos disclosing 
DeZoort [1998] an AC report 
McMullen and Archival 5 I cos with fi-
Raghunandan nancial reporting 
[1996] problems 
Menon and Archival 200 randomly 
Williams [1994] selected OTC 
cos 
Kalbers and Survey External audi-
Fogarty [1993] tors, internal 
audits, and CFOs 
from 90 U.S. cos 
Table 5 - (Continued) 
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Audit com- Results indicated significant positive associations between volun-
mittee report tary audit committee report disclosure in annual reports and com-
disclosure pany size, proportion of outside directors, leverage, and trade on a 
major stock exchange. 
Financial Companies with reporting problems were less likely to have fre-
reporting quent audit committee meetings. 
Board reli- Audit committee meeting frequency was positively associated with 
ance on the firm size. 
audit 
commmittee 
Audit com- When evaluating dimension of power related to ACE, the will to act 
mittee effec- was perceived to be the most important audit committee member 
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The audit committee diligence literature clearly demonstrates the impor-
tance of having an adequate number of meetings each year. Greater meeting 
frequency is associated with a reduced incidence of financial reporting prob-
!ems and with greater external audit quality. Several factors, including board 
mdependence and company size, are associated with meeting frequency. In 
terms of other diligence research, one study documents a relation between as-
sessed audit committee diligence and perceived ACE, and others have related 
voluntary audit committee disclosures to such characteristics as director inde-
pendence and company size. 
The primary limitation of this research area is that actual diligence is not 
observable by researchers, so various proxies must be used. While the number 
of meetings provides some signal regarding effort, factors such as audit com-
mittee motivation and incentives have received very little attention. We en-
courage research on sources of audit committee member motivation, as well as 
studies examining the effect of different audit committee member compensa-
tion schemes. As Kalbers and Fogarty [1993, p. 44] highlighted " ... audit 
committee members must bring a desire to carry out their duties." Factors po-
tentially affecting this desire have not been adequately examined. For example, 
researchers could address the possible motivational effects of audit committee 
stock ownership and the impact of penalties (litigation, reputation damage, 
etc.) for poor audit committee performance. 
5.0 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The preceding review indicates that each of the four factors contributing 
to ACE has been examined to some degree, but significant opportunities exist 
in each area. Before offering more explicit suggestions for future research in 
each area, we pose a fundamental research question: "Can the audit committee 
ever hope to meet the expectations placed on it by various stakeholders and 
actually achieve ACE given its current structure (e.g., part-time, limite~ ~e­
sources)?" Addressing this question requires consideration of the upper It.mlts 
of audit committee performance and changes in stakeholder expectatIOns. 
While it may be argued that audit committees are the last .line of defe~se wh~n 
it comes to financial reporting governance, this expectation m~y be mconsls-
tent with their current structure. We encourage research on thiS fundamental 
issue, including new insights on other possible structures for the audit commit-
tee that would enhance ACE. 
The sections below highlight specific research opportunities within each 
of the four ACE components. We also offer additional research questions, as 
well as some thoughts on research methods. 
5.1 Composition 
First, we believe that it is important to enhance the richness of audit 
committee composition measures. For example, additional work should use 
more complete and specific assessments of audit committee member fmancial 
'. 
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expertise, governance expertise, and independent thinking to ide~tify the fac-
tors most associated with ACE and to evaluate the types of expenence, knowl-
edge, and abilities needed by audit committee members. For example, research 
could address whether overall audit committee experience and current audit 
committee tenure affect overall ACE. Studies that include such variables could 
help to address questions about the need for audit committee member rotation. 
Second, with recent recommendations and requirements related to mem-
ber independence, fmancial expertise, and fmancial literacy, additional re-
search is needed to assess changes in ACE as a result of the new requirements. 
Interest should focus on whether the new requirements result in largely cos-
metic changes or whether they appear to be associated with increased ACE. 
Third, we highlight the need to push audit committee research beyond 
individual-based studies to consider issues at the team level. While practical 
constraints (e.g., accessing adequate numbers of subjects, accessing members 
working in their committees) are prevalent, certain methods (e.g., field studies) 
provide opportunities for progress on several questions. For example, future 
research is needed to evaluate what mix of audit committee member back-
grounds best promotes ACE. Numerous questions remain about whether audit 
committees should be composed primarily of accounting experts or of mem-
bers with a mix of fmance, accounting, and auditing competence. In addition, 
our review of the literature indicates that there is relatively little research on 
group variables (e.g., committee member interaction and teamwork, group 
process loss and gain, member dominance) that can affect ACE. The team as-
pect of audit committees is essentially unexplored, yet considerable literature 
in organizational behavior and psychology [e.g., see Guzzo and Shea, 1992] 
could help to guide this research. 
Finally, we encourage research on the ability of public companies to at-
tract audit committee members in the current environment. Of particular inter-
est is whether the ability to attract audit committee members varies with com-
pany characteristics such as size, industry, and proxies for agency costs. 
5.2 Authority 
First, we believe that additional research is needed to track the expansion 
of audit committee responsibilities, including, for example, oversight of the 
I! /I~ dom~in, i~ternational accounting and auditing issues, and the corpora-
tIon s relationshIp to the external audit firm. The ITIIS area provides a good 
example of such an emerging area because some are calling for the audit com-
mittee to expand its responsibilities in this area. KPMG's Audit Committee 
Institute [2002] found that a majority (63%) of 700 audit committee members 
and senior management members surveyed believe that "the board and/or audit 
committee needs to improve their oversight of their company's information 
security." The NACD [2001] highlighted the need to consider audit committee 
responsibility over ITIIS domains and whether members are competent to pro-
vide effective oversight in this area. Similarly, Horton et al. [2000, p. 3] noted 
that audit committees should "insist that systems and their users provide ade-
quate management control and accountability balanced against the needs of the 
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organization, and require that information be protected from unauthorized or 
un~tended modification, destruction, disclosure, or other endangerment." The 
rapid rate of growth and change in ITIIS, and relative ambiguity in audit com-
mittee responsibilities and capabilities in the area justify future study. 
Second, we encourage research on the ultimate source of the audit com-
mittee's authority, the board of directors. Specifically, we recommend research 
that investigates how and why the board's degree of reliance on the audit 
committee varies and how this variation is associated with ACE. Finally, we 
highlight the need for more authority research focusing on the relationships 
and interfaces among audit committees and external auditors, internal auditors, 
management, and legal counsel given the required dependencies among 
groups. Such research could expand current understanding of how the audit 
committee's authority is affected by its relationships with other participants in 
the governance process. 
5.3 Resources 
First, we highlight the need for research on factors that are associated 
with the quality of information provided to the audit committee and how in-
formation quality affects ACE. Research specifically addressing information 
flow t<,> the audit committee could provide important insights on how to de-
velop better information systems for audit committees. 
Second, we suggest the need for research on the audit committee's use of 
outside advisors in the pursuit of' ACE. Specifically, such research should 
evaluate the extent that audit committees use outside advisors and the types of 
support provided by such advisors. In addition, these resource studies could 
test whether there is an association between ACE and advisor usage (or the 
type of advisor), and whether any evidence of causal links exists. . . 
Third additional research is needed to better understand the relatIOnships 
among th~ audit committee, internal auditors, and external auditors. The audit 
committee needs external and internal auditors to stay up-to-date on emerging 
accounting issues and changes, as well as on certain company-specific issues. 
For example, relevant and reliable information about technical accounting is-
sues is essential for dealing with auditor-management disagreements. While 
the experimental literature has started to address ACE in such disputes [e.g., 
DeZoort and Salterio, 2001 ; Knapp, 1987], more research is needed to under-
stand audit committee interaction with and reliance on auditors, management, 
and other stakeholders (e.g., legal counsel, other directors). In addition, we 
suggest research on the dynamics of typical audit committee-auditor interac-
tions and relationships, with specific focus on the impact of new regulations. 
5.4 Diligence 
The relative paucity of audit committee diligence research (beyond the 
meeting frequency proxy) is probably due in large part to the methodological 
challenges associated with measuring and assessing the construct. Diligence is 
extremely difficult to observe directly, so innovative methods are needed for 
progress in the area. Clearly, many opportunities for further research remain. 
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First, we suggest that future studies consid~r alternati~e proxies for dili-
gence or incentives when direct measurement IS not .posslble. For ~xam~le, 
empirical research is needed to assess whether ACE. IS affected by mcentIve 
variables such as audit committee member stock holdmgs or member compen-
sation amount (e.g., base director stipend, base audit committee stipend, meet-
ing fees) and type (e.g., cash, stock~. ~undamen~ll~, we need ~o address what 
makes audit committee members vlgtlant and wlllmg to ask IIDpOrtant ques-
tions that challenge management, internal auditors, external auditors, and other 
audit committee members. This stream of research also could focus on alterna-
tive forms of accountability (e.g., justification, feedback) and their impact on 
member and committee performance, as well as on the risks / penalties associ-
ated with audit committee service. For example, it is important to understand 
such factors as litigation risk, reputation damage, possible loss of future board 
opportunities, etc. and their relation to audit committee member motivation. 
Second, we suggest the need to focus on process variables such as setting 
the committee agenda, evaluating and updating the charter, considering the 
committee's responsibilities in the context of other committees' responsibili-
ties, and gathering relevant and reliable information from management, exter-
nal auditors, and internal auditors. Each of these variables is a potentially im-
portant component of diligence and could be useful in establishing 
correlational or causal links to ACE. 
5.5 Other Issues 
One of the limitations of the ACE framework used in this paper is the 
likely overlap and interaction among the four formative components. Addi-
tional research is needed to explore such issues. For example, understanding of 
ACE could improve considerably from studies of how composition variables 
(e.g., independence, expertise) interact with authority variables (e.g., degree of 
board reliance on the audit committee) and resource variables (e.g., external 
and internal auditor support). Future research also should examine the extent 
to which stakeholders associate the quantity and quality of audit committee 
disclosures with committee competence, authority, and/or diligence. 
. We also highlight the need to assess the generalizability of research fmd-
lOgs to date. For example, future research is needed to assess audit committee 
performance in international and multinational settings. Specific issues of in-
terest include (a) how U.S.-based fmdings related to ACE components apply in 
international and multinational settings, (b) whether cultural and economic 
differences affect the components of ACE, and (c) whether desired member 
skill sets, resources, and diligence differ across country and culture. We also 
encourage future ACE research that extends beyond publicly-traded companies 
to evaluate the role of the audit committee in private companies and other or-
ganizations. Research could address the actual and perceived benefits of audit 
committees in these settings, as well as auditors' focus on the audit committee 
in assessing risk in such organizations. 
Finally, we emphasize the need to consider alternative research methods 
to triangulate the literature and provide new theoretical and practical insights 
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to enhance ACE. Our review indicates the relative dominance of archival and 
survey methods in audit committee studies to date. Psychology-based experi-
mental research involving audit committee member judgnltmt and decision~ 
making is less common, presumably because of the inherent challenges in ac-
cessing directors. Analytical modeling and experimental markets (economics) 
have yet to emerge in the audit committee literature, although they represent 
viable methodological complements. For example, analytical modeling could 
be useful in developing theory related to audit committee members' incentives 
under different reward (compensation) and penalty (legal liability) schemes. 
Alternatively, experimental markets lend themselves to the use of alternative 
subject groups (e.g., students) in tightly controlled laboratory settings. Such 
experiments could provide useful insights into the impact of incentives and 
information quality and flow on ACE. 
Ultimately, while the extant ACE literature provides many key insights, 
our framework and synthesis of the literature highlight numerous opportunities 
for improved understanding in the area. Given recent regulatory developments, 
ACE research should continue to be of interest to academics, professionals, 
and regulators. Researchers should continually monitor regulatory and profes-
sional developments to identify research projects that may directly contribute 
to the national dialogue on corporate governance and fmancial reporting. 
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ANNOTATED BmLIOGRAPHY 
1. Knapp, M. C. 1987. ~ em.pirical s~dy o! audit committee support 
for auditors involved in technIcal dIsputes WIth chent management. The Ac-
counting Review 62 (July) 578-588. 
Knapp conducted an experiment to investigate factors ~at c?uld ~u­
ence audit committee member su,?port for the external audItor m ~udltor­
management disputes. He hypothesized that members would be m~re likel~ to 
support the auditor when they were. corporate managers, when a Big 8 auditor 
was used, when the dispute was related to objective accounting standards, and 
when the auditee was in poor fmancial condition. Using a repeated measures 
design involving 179 audit committee members from California companies, 
the experiment involved auditor-management disagreements on subsequent 
event disclosure and materiality related to a proposed adjustment. The results 
revealed overall support for auditors in the disputes, although support was 
diminished when the members were not corporate managers, when the auditee 
was in strong fmancial condition, and when objective professional standards 
were absent. 
2. Kalbers, L. P. and T. J. Fogarty. 1993. Audit committee effectiveness: 
An empirical investigation of the contribution of power. Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice & Theory 12 (Spring): 24-49. 
Kalbers and Fogarty investigated the relation between ACE and audit 
committee power. They hypothesized that audit committee effectiveness is a 
function of the types and extent of audit committee power. Using LlSREL to 
assess the results of a survey involving audit committees members from 90 
U.S. corporations, they found that effectiveness included oversight of fman-
cial reporting, external auditors and internal control. In addition, the results 
indicated that audit committee power within the organization came from a 
combination of written authority and the clear support of top management. 
3. DeZoort, F. T. 1998. An analysis of experience effects on audit com-
mittee members' judgments. Accounting, Organizations and Society 23 
(January): 1-22. 
DeZoort examined whether experience affects audit committee members' 
oversight judgments. A sample of 87 audit committee members completed an 
internal control oversight task to evaluate whether experience facilitated 
comparability with a criterion group of external auditors. The results indi-
cated that both general domain and task specific experience made a signifi-
cant difference in audit committee members' internal control assessments. 
Members with experience made internal control judgments more like auditors 
than did members without experience. In addition, experienced audit commit-
tee members made more consistent judgments, had higher self-insight, higher 
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consensus, and higher technical content levels for additional items provided 
than did the members without experience. 
4. Carcello, J. V. and T. L. Neal. 2000. Audit committee composition 
and auditor reporting. The Accounting Review 75 (October): 453-467. 
Carcello and Neal evaluated the relation between audit committee com-
position and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion. Using a 
sample of 223 fmancially distressed companies from 1994, they found a nega-
tive association between the percentage of affiliated (inside and grey) mem-
bers on the committee and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion 
from the external auditor. 
5. Klein, A. 2002a. Economic determinants of audit committee inde-
pendence. The Accounting Review 77 (April): 435-452. 
Klein explored factors associated with variations in audit committee in-
dependence. Using a sample of 803 fIrm-years on the S&P 500, she f0u.nd 
that audit committee independence was positively associated with board .s~ze 
and board independence and negatively associated with growth opportumtl~s 
and fIrms with losses. The results suggest a negative relation between audIt 
committee independence and the value relevance of accounting earnings. 
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